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PREFACE
While often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts
of students should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully
will encourage scholarly research by students and provide a means
by which their efforts will be recognized. Phi Alpha Theta is
greatly indebted to the History Department of Western Kentucky
University headed by Dr. Richard Troutman.
We are grateful to
our Consulting Editors, Dr. Charles Bussey, Dr. Carol Crowe
Carraco, and Dr. David Lee, for their assistance in this project.
We also thank the Student Editorial Committee consisting of
Mark Lega, Alan Lescallet, and Terry Tatum. A special thanks
goes to Mr . Tom Foster for designing our cover. For her tireless
and exacting effort Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typist, Ms.
Medora Ann Woodward. Our most profound debt of gratitude goes
to the contributing writers--those who were published and those
who were not--that constitute a group which forms the heart of
any publication.
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THE WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

MOVE~IENT:

1870 - 1900
"
,no race oj men call I'ise above their mothers,
The sufJrage
movemellt is an effort to elevate the entire race by elevati ng its
womanhood. "

Nellie Nugent Somerville,
President of tIle Mississippi
Suffrage Association
II feminism is defilled as tIle belief thaL women are human
beings and entitled to tIle same opportunities for sell-expression
a" men, then America has sheltel'ed a feminist bias from the beginninK,
In both tIle eighteenth and nineteenth cent uri es foreign
travclel's l't'marked on the freedom given to women in America,
"A
p:l1'adisp J01' women," on(> eig ht ee nth- century German called Amel'ica,
and towar d the close of the nin eteenth century Lord Bryce wrote
that in the Ulllted SLates "it is easiel' fOl' women La find a career,
to obtain wor k oj an intell(>ctual as of a commercial kind, than in
any paJ'l of Europ(', "1
C'rtalllly thL
exp lain lhis feminist ULI", ,
111 <l :,ul..l.l..Ly U"lll!4 :,"aped out 01 a
.ilderness, women were active and important contributors to the
process of seltlement and civ i lization,
In addition, because women
have been scarce in America they have been highly valued,
During
almost the whole of th e colonial period men outnumbered women, and
even in the nineteenth century women remained scarce in the west,
For exa mple, 3S late as 1865 there were three men for each woman
in California; in Colorado the ratio was as high as 20 to I,
Such
diflerences in the sex ratio undoubtedly account for lhe West's
favorable attitude toward women as in an Oregon law of 1850 that
grunted land to single women and, eve n more significant Jar the
time, to married women; or in the willingness for Western territories
like Wyoming (1869) and Utah (1870) to grant the suffrage to women
long before other regions where the sex ratio was more nearly
equal,2
But if the irontier experience of America helped to create
a vague feminist bias that granted women more privileges than in
settled Europe, the really powerful force changing women's place
h ad little to do with the frontier or the newness of the country,
It was the industrial revolution that provided the stimulus to
women ' s hopes for equality of opportunity, encouraging the first
stage in the changing position of women--the removal of legal and
customary barriers to women ' s full participation in the activities
of the world,3
Judy Bussell
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Women, of course, have always had a role in the economic productivity of the naLion.
Before Lhe coming of the machine they
worked in tlleir homes to produce the food and clothing which tlleir
families needed, and they reared the children, nursed the sick And
took care 01 Lhe aged.
Farm wives Ilelped in Lhe fields and bal'ns,
and trademen's wives were olten lound in the family shop. But as
the country became more indusLrialized many home Lasks were Laken
over by commercial enterprise. Mass production made iL easier Dnd
oIten cheaper to purchase the family's greatest needs in the form
of processed foods and manufactured goods.
Because the new factory
system needed workers, women and even children were encouraged to
seek employment. 4
Today it is universally recogni~ed that men work ouLside the
home.
But before the industrial revolution 01 the nineteenth
century, the great majority of men and women wel'e co-workers on
the land and in the home.
The coming of machine production
changed all Lhat.
For a time, it is Lrue, many unmarried women
and children--the surplus labor of the day--were the principal
support of the new factory system, but only temporarily.
By the
middle of the nineteenth cenLury the bulk of industrial labor was
male.
The comiug of tile factory and the city thus wholly changed
the nature of men's work.
For the first lime in history, work
for most men was something done outside the lamily, psychologically
as well as physically separated from the home. 5
The same industrial process that separated work and home also
provided the opportunities for women to 101low men out of the home.
For that reason the feminist movement, botb socially and intellectually, was a direct result of tile industrial changes of the nineteenth
century.
Furthermore, just as the new industrial system was
reshaping the rural men who came under its influence, so it reshaped
the nature of women. 6
The process began with the home, which, in the early years 01
industrialization, was still the siLe of most women's work.
Because
of high land values, the city home was smaller than the farm house,
and with less work for Children, the size of the ul'ban tamily was
sma ller than the rur81.
MoreOVel", work in the urba n home cha nged,
Machines in factories now performed many of the tasks that had
long been women's.
In truth, the feminist movement began not
when women felt a desire fOl' men's jobs, but when men in factories
began to take away women's traditional work.
Factory-produced
clothing, commercial laundries, prepared foods (e.g. prepared
cereals, canned vegetables, condensed milk, bakery bread) were
already available in the years afLer the Civil War.
Toward the
end of the century an advanced feminist like Charlotte Perkins
Gilman, impressed by the increasing departure of women's chores
from the middle-class home, predicted that the Whole kitchen would
soon be gone,7
The most direct way in which industrialization altered the
social function of WOmen was by providing work for women outside
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lhe home.
Production by machine, 01 course, widened enormously
the uses to which women's lobor could be put once physical
stl'ength was no 1011ger a consideraLion. And toward the end of
the century, as business enterprises grew and record-keeping,
communicalions aud public relations expanded, new opportunities
for women opened up in business offices.
The telephone operator,
the typist, the clerieol worker and the stenogl'apher now took
places beside Lhe seamstress, the cotton mill operator and the
teacher. 8
As workers outside Lhe home, women buried the Victorian
stereotype of the lady under a mountain of reality.9 After all,
it was diflicult to argue that women as a sex were weak, timid,
incompetent, 1ragile vessels 01 spirituality when thousands of
them could be seen trudging to work in the early hours of the
day in ony city of the nation. 10
Feminists, such as Lucretia Mott and Elizobeth Cady Stanton,
who galhered at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 for Lbe f irst women's
convenlion, were lar removed from the mainstream of American life. ll
Many hod participaLed in the abolitionist struggle, demonstrating
by thejl' actions there the extent to which they deviated from
prevailing norms o[ lemale behavior. Attacking the tradition that
men and womBl1 should occupy totally separate spheres of activity,
Lhey demallded a drastic revision of the values and laws governing
relationshjps between tile sexes, and immediately launched an
assault on all forms of discrimination.
Their efforts were greeted
with ridicule and contempt. Th e Worchester Telegram denounced
t.he Seneca Falls Convention as an attempt at llinsurrection," and
a Buffalo paper referred to it as "revolutionary." Women's rights
advocates were generally dismissed as a "class of wild enthusiasts
and visionaries" and received little popular backing. 12
The ear ly feminists took an uncompromising stand on almost
all issues and set out. to e liminat e the rigid division of labor
between men and women.
SUffrage constituted only one of a long
series of demands, 13
The radical nature of the ear ly feminist movement was revealed
in the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolution s passed by the
women at Seneca FoIls,
In the nineteenth century, females were
not. allowed to testify in co urt, hold title to property, estab li sh
businesses, 01' sign papers as witnesses,
Beginning with the
assertion that "all men and women are created equal, " the
Declaration proceeded to indict mankind for it s "history of
repeated injuries and usurpations" toward women, The delegat es
charged that men had denied them political representation, mad e
them "civilly dead," refused them the right to own their own
property, an d "oppressed them on all sides," Hardly an area
existed, the feminists concl uded , where man had not consciously
endeavored to "destroy woman ' s confidence in her own powers,
to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a
dependent and abject life."14
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To counter the oppression which they observed, women's l'il!;hts
leaders proposed the elimination of all barriers separatinl!; the
activities 01 the two sexes.
Henceforth, they declared, any law
which restricted woman's freedom or placed her in a position
inferior to men had "no force or authol'ity." Proclaiming' the
"identity of the race in capabilities and responsibilities,"
they demanded the "overthrow of the monopoly of tile pulpil,"
equal access to education, the trades, and professions, an end
to the double standard, and tile right to move in "tile enlarged
spilere" which their Cl'ea tOl' had assigned them . God had made men
and women equal, the femillists asserted, and the Lreatment of
one sex as different from and less equal than the other ran
"contrary to the grea t precept 0 r natu1'e, "15
For much of the remainder of the nineteenth century, women's
rights leaders continued to press for sweeping social change,
The
Suffrage became a more prominent issue aCtel' Congress failed to
recognize women's right to vote in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, but many feminists persisted in tracing female inequD 1ity to the sexual division of labor in society and warned agaillst
thinking of the franchise as a cure-all , Speaking through a
journal entitled The Revolution, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a founder
of the women's rights movement, dismissed the surrl'age as a
"superficial and fragmentary" question,
"The ballot touches only
those interests, either of men and women, which take their roots
in political questions," Stanton and her followers declared in
1869.
"But woman's chief discontent is not with Ilel' political,
but with her social, and particularly her marital bondage,"16
Stanton and her allies attacked economic discrimination, urged
reform of the divorce laws, and in Lile ]890 ' s organized a monumental
effort to write a Woman ' s Bible to counteract the widespread
theological assumpt10n that females were the weak and inierior
sex . Perhaps the most significant figure in the woman's movcment
during the nineteenth century, Stanton supported acquisition of
the vote as a partial step toward achieving freedom, but her
broader aim remained "to make woman a self-supporting equal partner
with man in the staLe, the Church and the home.,,17
This radical persuasion received its most thorough definition
at the turn of the century in the works of Charlotte Perkins Gilman,
A 1 though Gilman wrote primarily f01' a twentieth-century audience,
she articulated more brilliantly than anyone else the pOint of
view held by many of the founders of feminism.
A writer and
lecturer who had been through an unhappy early marriage. Gilman
approached her SUbject with the same disaffecLion 1'ronl traditional
mores which characterized the women in Seneca Falls and elaborated
the sentiments expressed there into a social and economic analySiS,
Her treatise on Women and Economics (1898) was hailed by the
Nation as "the most signIficant utterance on the subject since
MillIs The Subjection of Women," and her wl'itings to this day
constitut:e the most 1mporLant feminist asse~sment of women's
position in America,18
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At the heart 01 Gilman's annlysis wns her conLention thaL all
the roles n female was permitted Lo play derived from her sexual
lunetions.
A man migll! pursue a variety of aetivities--build a
cal'eel', ellt(>r politics, join a fraLernal organization.
But a
woman eould only marry and have cllildren.
In effect. sex became
a female's ee-onomic way of lile: while "men worked to live.
wom<'n mated Lo live.
" " man might. conquer Lhe wOl'ld in a
hundred ways, but lor a woman Lhere was only "a single channel,
a single' cholet
WenlLh, power, so(;ial distinction. iame.
all, must comc' to her thl'ou!{h a small gold 1'ing."19
Woman's human impulses to grow and to create werc stilled.
Men were deni0d L,'uc companions because their wives shared not.hing
in common with them.
And children were psychologically deprived
as a I'CSU] t. o[ being domina ted by mothers who had never been
allowed to gl'OW Lo menial maturit.y. A nation which expected to
maximize Lile potential 01 all its citizens depended upon each
individual pursuing his 01' he,' talents.
Yet. social convention
die-tated thaL 11011 the race perform noLhing but menial household
tasks.
The sexual division of labor thus not. only dulled women's
minds and limited their horizons; it also robbed the country of
the full utilization 01 its human resources. 20
Gilman concluded that women could achieve freedom only when
they gain0d economic equaliLy wiLh men.
The suffrage represent.ed
one sLep in lhe right direction and received Gilman's endorsement.
Work, Gilman believed, was "the essential process of human life."
and ulltil women shared in that process on an equal basis with men,
Lhey would remain "near-sighted, near-minded," and inferior. 21
To achieve her goal, Gilman relied primarily on the power of
reason and tlw forces of specialization which were changing the
notional economy.
The home, she argued, was frightfully inefficient.
Women were no more suited or contented to be "house servants and
house keepers than all men would be." The talents of some women
qunlified them to be specialists in cooking, cleaning, or child
care.
But the talents 01 others could be best utilized outside
the home in bUSi n ess ::Ind the professions.
With most women libel'ated from domestic chores, marriage would evolve into a partnership
of equals; individual human beings would maximize their diverse
abilities, and societ.y would be free of the crippling effect.s of
a dual system of labor.
The result "would be a world of men and
women humanly relaLed, as well as sexually related, working
together as they wel'e meant to do, for the common good of all. .. 22
Despite its brilliance, Gilman ' s analysis W::lS weak in several
areas.
She neglect.ed to mention the depersonalization wh ich might
acCOmpallY institutionalized child care and food preparation, and
she failed to see that the nuclear family might have positive as
well as negaLive attributes.
More important, she ass um ed that
even after women had adopted a life style closer to that of men and
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had become equal partners in the quest for jobs and status. they
would continue to exhibit primarily the domestic virtues of warmlh
and nurture--a desirable goal, perhaps, but a logical inconsistency
considerillg her previous contention that male and female differences
were basically a product of contrasting environmental conditioning.
Nevertheless, Gilman's arguments represented the full elaboration
of the feminist impulse. More than anyone else, she ullderstood
the social implications of the doctrines articulated at Seneca
Falls. 23
Long befol'e Gilman's views drew Pllblic attolltion, Ilowevel', it
was clear that the changes which she and StanLon advocated bad
little chance of being accepted.
In criticlzing the nuclear family,
marriage, and the church, feminists like Gilman were attacking
institutions to which most people were deeply devoted.
Woman's
place could not be changed wiLhout altering the family and forcing
a radical revision of a whol~ set of social relationships.
Yet
most Americans reacted to such a prospect with understandable
hostility. 'fhe idea of woman's "sphere" was one of tile COI'llerstones of society.24
The feminists did not help their cause when they allowed
themselves to be identified with proposals to liberalize sexual
morality.
In the 1870's Victoria Woodhull, a friend of Susan B.
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, endorsed free love and licensed
prostitution in her weekly newspaper. Advocacy of sexual freedom
was bad enough. but Woodhull tben went on to create a public
uproar by charging that the respectable reformer Henry Ward
Beecher was having a love affair with Elizabeth TilLon.
Beecher
instituted a libel suit, prolonging the public uproar, and
prominent feminists rushed to 1V00dhull's defense.
Horace Greely.
among otller-s, had previously stated that 11e could not support the
feminists because they were too closely tied to the C8use of free
love.
Now, Woodhull's declarations, and her widely publicized
association with feminists, appeared to confirm Greely's allegations,
and added one more weapon to the anti-feminist arsenal. 25
Such episodes inevitably took their toll. As the century
wore on, it became increaSingly obvious that if the woman's
movement continued to advocate serious change in mal'l"iage and
the family, it would be dismissed as a radical group and charged
with trying to destroy the moral fiber of the nation. 26
In the woman's movement, the forces of compromise gradually
gained increased strength. The years aiter the Civil War saw
feminism divided into different camps--the "conservativc" American
Woman's Suffrage Association, which was concerned almost exclusively
with winning the ballot, and the "liberal" National Woman's
Suffrage Association, which was committed to more f~r-reaching
institutional change.
By the end of the century, the degree of
opposition to more radical feminist demands had made the liberal
position defenseless, and in 1890 the two wings of the movement
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rcuni ted as lhc Na Lional American Woman's Suffl'age Associalion
(NA WSA) concel'ned primal'i I y wi Lh lhe goa I 01 wi nni ng the suf frage-Lile most respectable and limited feminist demand,27
At the same time, women's-rights leaders s hif ted from an
"al'gument from ,justice" to an " argument from expediency ," Elizabeth
Cady Stanton, at various times, had used the cxpediency argument,
and later women ' s-rights advocates never abandoned the argument
from justice, But by the turn of the century there was a s h ift
in thc balancc betwcen the two positio n s,
In stea d 01 e mphasi zing
the in alienablc l'igl1ts 01 Jemales as individuals, the feminists
Lended to emphasize th e utility of the ballot as an agent for
refol'ming society , And ratllcr than base th e ir appeal on the
similarity of mCll and women as human beings, they underlined the
ullcl13ngeable differences which disLinguished the sexes and gave
to eac h a uniqueness in politics,28
The positions the suffragis ts took on such issues as immigration, race, and religion l'cflccted th e extent to which they shared
prevailing pu blic opinion,
In 1894 Carrie Chapman Catt joined
thos e protesting Lhe influx of foreigners and warn e d against the
effort of undesirables to l'avage the na tion' s wealth,
"There is
buL one way to averl dangel'," Mrs, Ca lt declared:
"Cut off the
vole of the sl um s and give it to women, , , ,,,29 A year earlier
t.he suffJ'age convention had blatantly appealed to nativist fears
by cal lin g attention to th e fact that "ther e are more white women
who ca n l'ead and wri t e than all ncgro voters; more Am e rican women
who can read and write than all foreign vot. ers, " Woman suffrage,
th e conventio n suggested, "would settle th e vexed question of rul e
by illiteracy" and e nsure the perpet uation of the Am e rican way
of life,JO
Wit.h the advent of Progressivism, th e stra te gy of consensus
bore fruit,
Th e suffragists had already d ef in e d the vote for
wome n as a me ans of humanizing government, and in a period of
generalized commitment to "reform," they wel'e able to identify
t.ll e ir own cause with the lar ger effort to e xtend democracy and
eli minat e socia l injustice , Progr ess ivism mea nt a great many
thin gs to dill e r e nt. people, but in large part it r e presented an
effo rt to clean up th e most. obvious causes of corruption, disease,
and poverty , Within such D context, the suffrag ists argued convincingly that extension of the franchise to females would help in
th e task of improving society, To a remarkabl e extent, the
society at large d ef in e d the goals of Progressivism in the same
way, and as a result, the suffragists succeeded in making the
vot e for women a promin e nt item on the agenda of reform,31
Female r efo rmers , of course, played a d eC isive part in shaping
ProgreSS ivi s m through their involvem e nt in the social welfare moveme n t.,
Women lik e Ja ne Addams , Lillia n Wa Id, a nd Florence Kelley
st.art e d the settlement hous es which sprouted up in urban America

during the 1890's. and then carried their ideas and experience
into naLional organizations dedicated to securing legislative
change.
For such women, suffrage and the cause 01 social welfare
wet'e 10rever tied together.
Committed to building better neighborhoods and improving the conditions 01 workers in sweatshops and
factories. tlley realized that tbey could accomplish little wltllout
political power.
Woman SUffrage thus became a natural concern
of reformers 11'110 boped to mo~ilize an independent poliLical constituency which would 10rce party bosses into acLion.
The vote
Cor females, tile reformers believed, would add a sympathetic bloc
to the electorate and provide the leverage necessary to secure
social-welfare legislation. 32
Progressivism also provided a vehicle by which millions oj
hiLherto uninvolved middle-class women became politicized.
During
the years between 1895 and 1915, Robert Wilbe has written. almost
every established gro\lp wi thin the npw middle-class "experienced
its formative growth toward self-consciousness.,,:l:1
A look at progressivism in the Southern suffrage movement of
the nineteenth century is notewoltllY because ill the SouLh the
image of the lady took deep l'OOt and had far-reaching social
consequences.
The social role of women was unusually ronfilling
there.
One result was that southern women became in Lime a
distinct type among American women.
Rnother was lhat their
effol·ts to free themselves were more complex than those 01 womell
elsewhel'e. 34
"She wants the vote to use as a lever, and so do I," said
the heroine of a Virgillia novel, "but behind it all. . . J am
fighting for plain recognition 01 an equal humanity. ,,35 A
Kentucky suffragist wrote,
There are many women in tile South gifted with genius
and endowed with faculties for glorious work. who are
struggling to free themselves from the austerity oJ
those environments which 'the masses of average men'
have fixed for them.:l 6
Suffrage more than any other aspect 01 the feminist movement
became the symbol of women's emancipation.
Partly this was
because, historically. voting had been associated with the idea
of equal rights, partly because it was a general goal uP9n which
women witll many different specific purposes could agree. J7
To its opponents as well, "woman suffrage" meant more than
women voting.
The thrust 01 tile nineteenth century had been
toward a broader franchise.
But for every suffragist who linked
the vote to her humanity. there were men (and also women) who
equated ballots for females with a terrifying threat to society.38
In 1909 one Robert Holland summ~d up male fears in an article in
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the Sewanee Review.
Society forbade suffrage to women, Holland
asserted.
Female honor. he argued, was incompatible with voting.
"Her finer being has thus far refined Society by keeping out of
its turmoil." Unless the unseemly demand for "rights" ceased,
he predicted. women would gradua lly grow ugly and coarse.
Strife
would characterize family life, and in the end there would be
utter disaster. since "the first principle of religion is obedience.
The woman who does not obey her husband will not obey God who
enjoins her submission.,,39
Men were not alone in opposing suffrage in the South. Substantial numbers of southern women were slow to see any advantage
to themselves and were afraid to believe in something which displeased men. One woman wrote, "Every southern woman has a
protection and champion in every southern man."
Two decades
later another wrote that southern women did not want the vote
because they wanted "to preserve in their daughters the salient
characteristics of a past generat ion." Giving women the vote,
she said, would lead to divisions and dissensions in the home.
hitherto "the source of all good in the state." The glory of
womanhood has been "her purity, her superiority to man in the
possession of a high e r moral sense and standard.
Why risk this
precious certainty for a doubtful good?,,40
The Sout h was slow to develop an organized suffrage movement.
In 1848 the women who met at Seneca Falls had included the right
to vote in their list of demands. Because many of the early
suffragists were abolitionists, the idea of woman 's rights was
a curse in the South.41
Signs of suffrage sentiment appeared here and there in the
South in the first decade after the war.
In 1869 suffrage
resolutions were presented to constitutional conventions in Texas
and Arkansas. A woman's rights convention was held in Columbia,
South Carolina, in 1870 with the blessing of the Reconstruction
govern ment.
In 1876 a Mississippi woman addressed the Democratic
Convention, assembled in Nashville, in behalf of woman suffrage. 42
These flur ri es of suffrage sentiment did not represent a
large body of opinion. A report from Alabama in the third
volume of the History of Woman Suffrage, published in 1886 ,
noted that women there were "awake on the temperance question"
but unprepared for suffrage. As late as 1897 a national organizer
traveling in Mississippi wrote bitterly that suffrage was often
seen as a "heresy that has a real devil in it." and that "death
and education have much to do in this southland. "43
Through the seventies and eighties, however , a few tireless
women kept the fires alive.
In Kentucky the four Clay sisters-Mary, Anne, Sallie, and Laura--were virtually a suffrage organization
in themselves.
In Tennessee, Elizabeth Avery Meriwether, des cr ibed
as "the c hie f representative of libera l thought in Tennessee,"
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was a hardy soul who had survived a diificult period as a war
refugee and had returned to ~lemphis aItel' the wal' to establish
and edit lJer own newspaper, calleel The Tablet,4 ~1
These early suffragists did not need a "movement" La bring
them to the cause. Two things they had in common:
a strong sense
of their own capacities and the ability to be sell-starting,
Some of them lJad begun to show maverick tendencies before the war.
Those who were old enough had faced the war itself with independence
and courage and a£tel'lvard were prepared for the )'idicule and se01'I1
often direc ted at "stl'ong-minded" WOltlen,
Indeed, SOllie of them
seemed to gain positive satisfaction from being different; involvement in the suffrage struggle gave them an independence and an
identity which they found llIuch to their liking,ij5
Suffrage organizations did noL limit themselves to the single
cause of the ballot, The record shows southern suffragists to
have been engaged in a wide val'iety of reform efforts, The New
Orleans Equal Rights Association, for example, took tile lead
first in the anti-lottery campaign and then in securing modern
sewage and drainage and a pure water supply,
In addition to their
concern Jor temperance, child labor, and the working conditions
of women, suffrage groups worked for women's colleges, Jar laws
which would permi t women to serve on school boards, lor tuberculosis
control, for prenatal clinics, and for modificaLion in the age
of consent,46
Despite its significance in training numbers of women in
politics, despite the symbolism that it developed for women in
search of a new life-style, the organized e~fort to attain woman
SUffrage was less effective in the South than in almost any other
part of tbe country,
When the Nineteenth Amendment passed the
Congress and was sent to the states for ratification, only Texas,
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas among southern states voted to
accept it,
Women mounted vigorous campaigns in all the other
states, but were defeated,
They wasted little time in regret.
They accepted suffrage as a gift fl'om fellow citizens outside
the South and went promptly to work to give meaning to the newfound right,47
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RFK AND CIVIL RIGHTS
"1961:
IT HAD ONLY JUST BEGUN"
Some men sec things as they are and say why.
I dream things that never were and say why not.
When Robert Kennedy became Attorney General 01 the United
States in January, 1961, he was not well acquainted with the wants
and needs of American Negroes.
But Kennedy, "a man of constan t
growth and Change, "1 soon developed an acute sensi tivi ty oj the
need for improved civil rights and dedicated much oj his rem;}ining ye;}rs to that goal. The manncr in which he npproached tile
issue from 1961 until his death in 1968 is of great significance.
Instead of agonizing over why the country had reached such a
crucial level, he concerned himself with developing and initiating
new ideas and programs to alleviate existing situations. Although
considered ruthless, unyielding and insensitive al limes, Robcrt
Kennedy came to be the embodiment 01 the phrase he lre![ucnlly
borrowed from George Bel'nard Shaw:
"Some men see things as
they are and say why.
I dream things that never were and say
why not." Consequently this direction of thinking was to oIfcl'
hope and encouragement Jor both blacks and wh1 tes in this ('ountry.
A foundation for this approach appears in KennC'dy's Iil'sl
public address on the issue of civil rights. After scrving as
Attorney General for only three months, the 35-year-Old ~assachusctts
native accepted an invitation to address the Honol"s Day convocation at the University of Georgia Law School in Athens,
Georgia. His "blueprint for civil l'igh Ls," as TllOmas Hopkins
appropriately named it, also was his first formal address on any
subject since becoming Attorney General .
With the aide of his
speech writers, Kennedy prepared lor almost two months prior to
the speaking engagement on May 6, 1961, and according to Hopkins,
"they could take satisfaction in a job well dOlle,"2
It now seems important to ask whether or not Kennedy's
speech was as effective as it was well-prepared.
Racial discrimination towards black Americans has been pervasive ever since
the first slaves were brought to this country in tile early 1600's.
Through the years, countless men have championed the cause, but
why is it that only a certain Iew are remembered"? Three reasons
come to mind:
1) They were a "first" in one way or another;
2) They said "the right thing in the right way at the right time
and place"; and 3) Their efforts resulted in positive action.
An application of these factors to Kennedy's civil l"ights address
sheds insight on his success and his "visionary approach" to the
problem which makes him long remembered.
Beverly Davenport
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Let us turn to Lhe speech itself to note the materials and
methods he employed to accomplish his purpose. Although it was
customary in the early 1960's to co nd emn segregation in t h e
North, Kennedy was the first high ranking governmenta l official
to do so in the South . 3 It seems evident that this fact alone
would have a definite effect on Lhe audience. The "touchy
subject" of civil rights, as it was described in a Newsweek
magazin e article, was one of the most salie n t issues of the time. 4
It was even more salient to the p eo p le o f Athens, Ge or gia, than
to those in other parts 01 tile co untry. Only lour months prior
to Kennedy's address, nearly 600 Univ ersity of Georgia students
participaLed in riaLs and demonstrations because Negro students
Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes were allowed matriculation
a t the school. The two were sus p ended for "their own sa fety "5
following the demonstrations but were later allowed to return
and finally graduate in June, 1963. They were the first blacks
to achi eve such a distinction at the Univ e rsity of Ge orgia.
With these eve nt s still fresh in th e audience's mind, Ke nn e dy
had the monumental task of presenting his id eas in an acceptabl e
manner to a somewhat hostile audience.
But in his words, "to
have chosen any other subject would have been hypo cr itical. "6
It seems in ev itable that such a c ontroversial s ubj ec t would b e
met with opposition.
Shortly before h e arriv e d, the police
arrested live f undam e nta~ist ministers who we r e picket ing with
signs that read, "Th e Bibl e tea c hes separation." During the
ni g ht young boys had painted the sidewalks with "Yankee go home,"
but th is was washed off before Ke nn e dy arrived th e next morning.
According to Th e New York Times, Georgia politicians "were
notable by t heir absence," becaus e they heard Kenn e dy would talk
about civ il rights . 7
Here was a high ra nking govern ment officia 1 advoca ting c i vi 1
rights r ef orm before an overwhelmingly southern white audience
who had witnessed demonstrations only months before. This
encounter was truly a first.
With the issu es of civil rights
c oming to the forefront in almost all areas of the country today,
such an e nd ea vor might seem inSignificant. But Kennedy's remarks
came on the eve of what later turned out to be a moral revolution .
At the early, most crucial stages, almost all remarks were
temper e d with restraint.
Few were quite so bold quite so early
in quite the same sit u at ion.
Organi z ation played a vital role in the success of Kennedy's
speech.
In th e introduction, he us e d the common ground approach
with an added bit of humor to capture the audience's attention.
Aft e r congratulating the honor students, Kennedy related a
personal ex perience of award winning.
He said h e was named the
student with the fifth best sense of humor in his graduating
class from the University of Virginia Law School. This, according
to Ja y Cox, "eased a lot of tension.,,8 Cox was president of the
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Advisory Council of the Law School who had visited Kennedy carly
in March and had asked him to speak. This off-the-cuff remark
did not appear in the formal text but did contribute to the
overall effect.
He lIsed another conunon ground approach to open
his formal text. Talking of his recent presentation of the
Young American Medal for Bravery to Donald McGregor, Kennedy
complimented him as "one of a long line of Georgians who have by
their courage set an outstanding example for theil' fellow
Americans."g He followed this with a note of humor by saying
that he could not find any kinfolk in Georgia, a task which
many called a prerequisite to speaking there.
This tOllch of
humor and regional intel'est may. as Cox observed, have helped
ease the tension and make the audience more receptlve to further
comments.
Briefly he addressed two areas of major concern which
fell under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department:
organized
crime and "illegal practices by the amateurs." He touched upon
these only lightly. They merely served as a warm-up to the
third al'ea "that affects us all the most directly--civil rights ... 10
The remainder of the speech was addressed to civil rights which
comprised nearly two-thirds of the entire presenta tion. Althougll
an emotional subject, Kennedy wisely chose Dot to use emotional
appeals.
Instead he turned to logic in his quest for gaining
acceptance and adherence to his philosophy.
'~ob recognized the
need for dramatic manifestations of civil rigbts work but also
the need for a very basic and pragmatic approach to the political
problem in vol ved," sa id John Seigentlla ler. Kennedy campa ign a ide
and now editor of the Nashville Tennessean. 11 The young Attorney
General explained the C1Vl1 rlghts issue as a matter oj law, and
be emphasized the preeminence of law in a democracy. By presenting
tbis enthymeme, he expected his audience to infer that abiding by
civil rights decisions was imperative for the continuation of a
democracy. He quoted his brother by saying "law is the strongest
link between man and freedom."
"Respect for the law." he said,
"is the meaning of Law Day, and every day must be Law Day or else
our society will collapse.,,12 He continued this line of reasoning by saying "I happen to believe that the 1954 (Supreme Court)
decision was right. But my belief does not matter--it is the
law.
Some of you may believe the decision was wrong. That does
not matter.
It is the law. And we both respect tl1e law. ,,13
Speaking to an audience of 1,600 alumni and students of the
University of Georgia Law School, Kennedy was appealing to their
sense of values and respect for the law.
Anotber important psychological factor was Kennedy's appeal
to the needs of the audience.
In case of further demonstrations
and riots, Georgians and other Americans needed to know how the
Justice Department would act or what would be their role. Kennedy
fulfilled this need by explaining:
I hold a constitutional office of tbe United States
Government, and I shall perform the duty I have
sworn to undertake .
. we will not make or interpret
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the laws.
We shall enforce them vigorously, without
regional bias or political slant
. we will not
pCH·secuLe.
We wi 11 prosecu te. 14
This response served to condiLion the audience for future Justice
DepartmenL actions. He fulfilled another need by offering hope
in time of despair:
For on this generation of Americans falls the full
burden of proving to the world that we really mean
it when we say all men al'e created free and equal
before the law. All of us might wish at times that
we lived in a more tranquil world, but we don't.
And if our times are difficult and perplexing, so
are they challenging and filled with opportunity.15
He skillfully emp loy ed his brother's much used aphorism "every
danger is an opportunity." 16 During a crisis situation, hope
stands as a unify ing force.
Kennedy's attempt to pass this
hope along Lo his audience elicited positive responses.
University
of Geor gia sLudent Charlayne Hunter represented the Atlanta
Inquir er and was the only Negro pr esent.
In an interview with
Thomas Hopkin s in September of 1962, she said that "the memory
01 the AtLorney General's speech gave her courage to continue
during periods of discouragement."l? The Rev. Martin Luther King,
Jr., praised the speech as "a symbol the White South needs today."IB
Not only was this an offer of hope to blacks, but to every American
who believed in justice before the law. He offered this hope in
the 10rm of challenges and opportunities that could result from
the situat ion.
Most interesting of Kennedy ' s psychological appeals was his
referral to the famous Georg~n Henry Grady who also had talked
about liberty and respect for the law.
It is not ironic that he
would have chosen such a person to quote.
No doubt, this was
another psychological ploy to gain acceptance from his audience.
Grady was the first southerner to ever speak before the prestigious
New England Society in New York. Kennedy was the first high
ranking official to speak about civil rights in the South.
Some
seventy years prior to Kennedy ' s spea k ing engagement, Grady coined
the phrase "The New South" and gave his last formal address on
the subject when speaking in Kennedy ' s home state of Massachusetts.
Kennedy delivered his first civil rights speech in Grady's hometown
of Athens, Georgia . There are other interesting similarities between
the two. Both spokesmen of human liberty had attended the
University of Virginia; Kennedy grad uated from the Law School,
while Grady completed a year of graduate study.
Both were of
Irish descent and both died in the prime of their lives --Kennedy at age 42, Grady at age 39 . During their lifetimes and
after, both represented a cause and symbolized a new spirit.
Each envisaged a brighter future for the people of this country.
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Whether planned or not, Kennedy's text followed the same
pattern as Grady's "New South" speech. Like Grady, Kennedy
opened his speech on a humorous note but spoke seriously of the
matter at hand for the remainder of the time.
"He spoke wi th a
directness, a simplicity, and a depth of feeling.
."19 says
Marvin Bauer of Grady. The same could be said of Kennedy.
Both alluded to the hope of "a common brotherhood for the
American people." Bauer says Grady realized the need for the
cultivation of an attitude. 20 Perhaps Kennedy also realized
this --- an attitude of respect for the law as well as for all
human beings regardless of race, color or creed.
Whether or not Kennedy developed his entire text around
Grady's is unknown.
Certainly he was aware of the factors
contributing to Grady's success since he employed similar ones.
According to a University of Georgia professor, "it was a stroke
of genius"21 to quote Grady, especially in his hometown of Athens.
Kennedy closed his speech by reminding the audience that one of
their own had also declared that America stood for human liberty.
Placement of that quotation is also significant.
It was in the
closing that Kennedy quoted from Grady's speech. Thus he left
his audience with something to think about.
He summarized the
major theme of his address by using the words of one already held
in high esteem by his audience . An application of Osgood and
Tannebaum's congruity theory would allow one to assume that
he enhanced his own ethos by this gesture.
Also noteworthy in the speech is Kennedy ' s use of language.
Throughout the text, he used short, direct and clear statements .
"Our position is quite clear," he said.
"We are upholding the
law. "22 According to educator Richard Neistadt, "Bob much more
tha n Jack, had his drive to the direct approach."23 This
situation proved to be no exception, and his audience seemed
appreciative of this calculated gesture.
"Never before, in all
its travail of by-gone years, has the South heard so honest and
u n derstandable a speech from any Cabinet member," observed
Ralph McGill, publisher of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution. 24
The Philadelphia Inquirer referred to it as a "nota hIe speech
because of what he sal.d and where he said it . ,,25 The New York
Times went even further by saying "Mr Kennedy ' s text used firm
language and his voice was even firmer as he delivered it."26
The following excerpt is an example of this firmness .
. in all cases --- I say to you today that if
the orders of the court are circumvented, the
Department of Justice will act.
We will not
stand by or be aloof . We will move . 27
It was his intention in the May 6th speech to make public his
approach to the civil rights problem.
It would be important to
avoid confusing and ambiguous terms that could be misinterpreted.
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Flowery, vague, or perplexing language would have served only
as a deterrent. There is evidence that Kennedy was awa re of
this fact.
He spent the entire day before the speech go i ng
over it word by word, trying to predict the reaction to each
word and phrase until he was satisfied that every word conveyed
exactly the meaning he intended. 28 Undoubtedly, he realized
the importance of saying the "right thing in the right way at
the right time and place."
The final factor put forth to determine a speech or speaker ' s
success is whether or not one ' s efforts result in positive action.
It is for this reason more than any other that Ken nedy's speech
was a success.
Just as he had promised, the Justice Department
moved; they did not stand aloof when crisis situations arose.
There is little doubt that his "blueprint" eventually was put
into action. Only weeks after the speech was given, federal
agents began investigating civil rights complai n ts; pu blic
schools began initiating desegregation , and t h e federal govern me nt as a whole became more attentive to t he prob l em at hand .
These actions did not come as a result of Kennedy ' s speech, yet
his words served to forewarn or condition his audience for these
events. The Attorney General ' s wor d s offered encouragement and
strengthened the wil l to advocate a cha nge for t h ose who saw
discrimination as an inj ust i ce of the l a w. Th e we ll-known
Freedom Rides res u lted from those co ur ageous en o ug h to pu rs u e
the i r aims.
Beca use of t h e press u re o f those in c id e nt s, he arin gs
began on Au g ust 1 of the same year; on Septemb er 1 t h e dec i s i on
was made t hat, on Oct ober 1, all seat in g in bu ses wo uld be
without refere n ce to race, col or or creed , a n d t h at all car ri e r s
would have to have t h at s i gn in t h e i r buses.
In a ll t e rm i nal s
the "colored" an d "w hi te" s ig ns ha d to c om e down f r om a bo ve t h e
fountai ns a nd restr ooms . 29 T he n ext summer fe d era l governme n t
inter v e ne d aga in to "en f or c e ci vil rig hts sta t u tes " as Ke nn e dy
ha d prom ise d. Viol e nt prot es t s ar o se wh e n a youn g bla c k na me d
J a mes Mere di th tri e d t o e nter t he Uni versi ty of Missi ss ippi
in Oxford, Mi s si ss ippi . Acco r di ng t o Meredi t h , "Bobby Ke nn e dy
was th e ma in ma n in d e t e rminin g th at th e s e ste ps b e ta k e n .
Ha d t hey n o t ma d e t he d ec ision s th ey ma d e, th e co urse o f my
life woul d have b ee n di ffe r e n t.
Hi s d ec ision s k ept me al i ve .,, 3 0
Bobby Ke nn e dy , in t he nam e o f t~ f e d e ral gove rnm e n t, int erv e n e d a ga in and aga i n --- when Martin Luth e r Kin g wa s j ail e d ,
whe n Birmin g ham police unl ea shed dog s on Ne gr o d e mons t ra t or s ,
and wh e n v iol e n t rac i a l r iots e rupt e d in ma jor c i t i e s a cr oss
th e c ou nt r y . Ke nn e d y ' s p l e dg e t o uphold th e law became evide nt.
He wen t so far as to visit t h e s c e n es o f dis r u p tion in Birmingh a m
a nd Mi ss i ss ippi. By s ubm e r g in g hims e l f int o t h e issue , Ke nn e dy
wa s a bl e t o b ecome mo r e s ympath e ti c and sensitive to the civil
right s cau se . His c on ce rn and l e ade rship dur i ng those incidents
b eca me e ve n mor e a ppar e n t as h e worke d throu g h th e legislative
s yst e m. With his he lp a nd prodding , along with Pre sident
John s on' s a n d oth e rs, mor e prog r e ssive legislation in th e area
o f c i vil ri g hts wa s passe d in t h e mid-1960's than in all previous
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years combined . Years of strife were to continlle whic)) eventually
reslllted in the death of Kennedy in June of 1968. Had he not been
so vigilant by offering his "why not" approach, the cOllntry might
have moved even slower.
Undoubtedly, one man alone cannot be
given credit for the moral revolution this country witnessed
the past decade, especially since civil rights is still an acute
problem eleven years later. But had he not "dreamed things
that never were," we might not have been able to experience much
of the progress made thus far.
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THE ELECT ION DISPUTE OF 1876
During the Gilded Age many of the attitudes toward politics
and politicians seemed to be those of contempt and distrust.
Much of the populace considered those who worked in this ignominious profession of politics to be in the same category with
crooks, swindlers and the vultures who controlled big businesses.
These judgements were not without some foundation as illustrated
in the 1876 Presidential election.
The Presidential election of 1876 commenced and proceeded
like most national elections; but before a winner would be
declared, it was destined to be the most controversial and
complicated election in United States history. The candidates
involved in this magnificent display of corruption and rascality
were Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and his Democratic opponent,
Samuel J. Tilden.l Rutherford B. Hayes, "the Great Unknown,"
was nominated by the Republicans because he had not been blemished
by the scandals which marked Grant's administration . 2 In contrast, Samuel Tilden was nominated by the Democrats because he
had a reputa tion as a reformer. 3 Although the ca ndida tes were
very different, the platforms or issues on which they ran were
quite similar.
Both parties were guilty of using mudslinging
tactics wi th demagoguery as the ch i ef campaign tool. 4
It was a "dirty" campaign, but this was to be expected
because both parties were desperate--the Republica ns were in
power and they wanted to stay in power; the Democrats, espec ially
in the South, were determined to regain power and ostraci ze the
so-called carpetbaggers and "Negro-lovers." The "machines"
in both parties obviously fe lt the end justified the mea ns,
as illustrated by their campaign tactics in the Southern states .
The Democrats intended to win by ignoring the laws and the
Constitution concer ning Negro suffrage.
In effect, they would
continue utili z ing th e age-old technique of intimidation . Th e
Republicans intended , if n ecessary, to win by using--or abusing-the law on rejecting votes . Ess e ntially this law allowed votes
to be rejected on the grounds that intim i dation was used.
Thus
the Republi cans could us e the returning boards to their advantage
and ex pect federal protection in the process . 5
In the bitter struggle for the Presidency of 1876, both Hayes
and Tilden gave no speeches themselves; instead, they let other
people do their campaigning, which, of course, made any illegal
activities by their parti es much easier. 6 The two parties were
very evenly divided, so a close e lection was predicted. 7
Brady Ke ll e ms
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Corruption was evidently expected because President Grant
approved the increase of federal troops in Louisiana, South
Carolina, and Florida to protect Negro suffrage, and in effect,
gain support for the Republicans. S
After the polls had closed on the evening of November 7,
Tilden and his running mate, Hendricks, seemingly had won the
election by a landslide. Tilden had quickly amassed a large
majority of the popular vote and had a substantial lead in the
Electoral College. 9 The next day newspapers across the country
announced Tilden victorious in the Presidential election-even Hayes, himself, conceded defeat. lO But many strong, "hardheaded" Republicans were not ready to concede defeat because
four states--Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and Oregon-had not sent in their electoral certificates and the Republicans
controlled the political machinery in the three SouLhern states. ll
The Republicans in their search for some type of support, some
change in the election returns, some indication that Hayes might
have a chance to win, received at The New York Times' office a
dispatch from Dan Magone, chairman of the New York State
Democratic Committee, containing the following inquiry:
"Please
give your estimate of the elecLoral votes secured for Tilden.
Answer at once."12 This simple inquiry suggested Lhat the Democrats were still uncertain about the election. The Republican
party leaders seized this opportunity immediately and within a
few hours Zach Chandler, chairman of the Republican National
Committee, sent a telegram Lo Republican party leaders in
Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana telling them "Hayes is
elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana.
Can you hold your state? Answer at once. ,,13 The Republicans
knew the only chance they had was to claim the election first
and substantiate the claim afterward. 14 So when Chandler's
reply came from the contested states, he announced:
"Hayes
has 185 electoral votes and is elected. "15
Tbis statement set off a chain of events within both parties.
Abram S. Hewitt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee,
sent leading men - -Republicans as well as Democrats--to South
Carolina, Florida and Louisiana to see that a fair count was made,
and the returns honestly canvassed. 16 The next day President
Grant requested leading Republicans only to go to the disputed
states; therefore ... two sets oi "visiting statesmen" went to the
states in doubt. lf Although the superficial reason these
Republican "visiting statesmen" went to the disputed sLates was
to assure the lega Ii ty, they were in ef fect, to promo Le the
illegality of the returning boards in order to benefit their
party.18 Consequently, all four states--Louisiana, Florida,
South Carolina and Oregon--submitted two sets of electoral
returns, one by the Republicans and one by the Democrats. 19
The dispute over the Oregon electoral votes stemmed from
a technicality. One of the Republican electors held a small
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postmastership, which disqualified him und er th e federal Const it ution.2D In the dispute over the e l ectora l vot es of the
four states both parties were accusing the other of wrongdoings.
It i s int eres tin g to not e that in the Southern states the two
major part i es, rather than denying that they had cheated, were
justifying what th ey were doin g by pointing out the uns c rupulous
acts of the other. 21 Therefore, power rather th a n math e mati cs
was to decide this elect ion. A contest a fter the co nt est, a test
of party strength--this was the meaning of the Hay es -Tilde n
e l ection di s put e of 1876. 22 Wh e n th e election ca me down to the
wire, it depended on which of the two sets of returns would be
accepted flom the three disputed states: Florida, South Carolina,
a nd Louisiana.
But how was the disput e to b e settled?
On December 6, th e Electoral College awarded the di s puted
votes to Ha yes. Almost immedia t e ly th e De mocrats challenged
the returning board d ec i sions on th e grounds that the Re publicans
had us e d fraudulent me thods to attain th e votes. 23 Basically
th e s itua t i on was:
Both parties maintained that their set of
electoral returns were t he l eg itimat e cert ificates; th e refore, both
parti es c l aime d victory. Eventually the two parties came to a
deadlock in the dispute.
However, the American people were tir e d of the dispute and
wanted an en d to it. Only tw e lve years had passed since the
Civil War and they wer e not ready for another on e . 24 The Constitution gave the President of the Senate th e power to open
tbe certificates, in the presence of the Senate and Hous e of
Re pr ese ntatives , and to cou nt the votes. 25 But what if there
were more than on e certificate from a state? Th e Constitution,
implicit as it is, gave no specific g uid elines on th e subject.
Th erefo re, how was th e dispute to be settled?
Naturally both parties offered resolutions. The Republicans
maintained th e decision rests in the Supreme Court. This method
was clearly th e most ex pe ditious from a legalistic standpoint,
but it was also the most beneficial to the Republicans since
the majority of the Supr e me Court memb ers were Re publicans.
The Democrats held the d ec ision was l ega lly in the two houses
of Congress. Since th e Democrats controlled the house, this would
probably give the e lection to Tilden. 26 Finally, in January,
1877, Congress appointed an Electora l Commission to decide which
votes should go to Tilden and which for Hayes. 27 The Commission
would be composed of fifteen members:
five Senators, five
Representatives an d five Supreme Court Justi ces . 28 The Commission
would hav e seven Re publicans, seven De mocrats and one Independent;
but during th e d e bate in Congress over the Electoral Count Act
the one Ind epe nd e nt, Justice David Davis, was elected to the
Senate. 29 So Joseph P. Bradley, a Republican, was appointed as
the fifth Justice to serve on the Commission, thus giving the
Republicans an eight to seven majority.3D Consequently, all
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four of the disputed states were awarded to Hayes by a vote of
eight to seven. 31 The Democrats, of course, would not accept
this and threatened to use a filibuster to prevent the conp letion
of the electoral count.
Finally, on February 26 and 27 a series of secret conferences
were held between Southern Democrats and representatives for
Hayes. 32 The "Wormley House Bargain" superficially stated that
the Republicans would officially end Reconstruction in the South
and in return the Democrats would support Hayes' administration. 33
But the inner arrangements had the following stipulations: withdrawal of federal troops from the South, which in effect would
return the Democrats to power in their states; aid for internal
improvements; a federal subsidy for the Texas and Pacific Railway,
which would connect the South with the West and enhance economical
growth; and at least one Cabinet seat in the Hayes' administration.
In return the Southern Democrats would make sure enough Democrats
were absent from the new meeting of Congress to allow the
Republicans to organize the House and elect a Hayes spokesman,
James Garfield, as Speaker; also they would abstain from a
filibuster, which would give the Presidency to Hayes. 34 In the
end Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel Tilden by a majority of
one electoral vote (185-184). On March 2, 1877, just 56 hours
before Inauguration Day, Hayes was formally announced as winner
of the election. 35
The election dispute of 1876 was caused by corruption and
rascality within and without the political system. Hayes and
Tilden were probably scrupulous men, in so far as politicians
are allowed to be scrupulous. They were morally helpless and
were really nothing more than tools manipulated by their parties.
The methods of attaining or retaining the Presidency had little
to do directly with Hayes or Tilden. But indirectly both were
involved. 36 Most historians now believe that the states of
Louisiana and Florida were carried by Tilden, but when one
considers the intimidation employed by the Democrats and the
fraudulent actions of the Republicans, the electoral controversy
can still be disputed.
It is the opinion of this researcher that Hayes was the
best possible choice between the two candidates.
If Tilden had
won, it would have postponed business prosperity and industrial
progression in that immigration would have been prevented.
Furthermore, a Democratic victory would have been detrimental
to Negro suffrage . It is doubtful that Tilden would have gone
against the tide of his party to unleash the invisible chains
on Negro rights. As far as the corruption goes both parties
were guilty to some extent. The corruption in the electoral
system in 1876 dealt a heavy blow to both parties, and in general,
to the American political system itself. The climax of the
Hayes-Tilden election of 1876 was the electoral dispute, but the
significance was that it brought an end to the sectional power
struggle and produced a more unified nation . 37
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I.

A. J. P. TAYLOR:

GADFLY HISTORIAN

Contemporary historians have the same problem that contemporary artists have always had; everyone knows they are here,
but nobody wants to admit their worth.
This is especially true
for those would-be maverick historians that refuse to tote and
lift on the commands of the profession's establishment.
Alan John Percivale Taylor was born on March 25, 1906, the
only son of a well-to-do Radical-Liberal cotton manufacturer
in Southport, Lancashire, England. l His early education was
spent in the solemn atmosphere of a Quaker school in York, where
he was a good, if not always model, student. From these surroundings Taylor gained admittance to Oriel College, Oxford,
where he prided himself for being the entire college's only
Labour club member. 2
Upon Taylor's 1927 graduation with a B. A. in history
(accomplished with First Class Honours) he set out for Vienna
to study diplomatic history under the tutelege of A. F. Pribram.
In 1930, still only twenty-four years old, Taylor accepted the
position of lecturer in modern history at Manchester. 3 Taylor,
who secured his Master's degree in 1932, remained at Manchester
until 1938 when he was appointed as a Fellow of Magdalen College,
Oxford and became a well-received lecturer in international
history. Though he has never been awarded a university chair,
A. J. P. Taylor has been Ford's lecturer in English history,
1955-56; Leslie Stephens' lecturer, Cambridge, 1961-62; and in
1956 was elected to the British Academy.4
Taylor is a lover of music, wine, food, and old buildings. 5
He is a superb television performer, often appearing on t~e B.B . C.
broadcasts of Brains Trust and Free Speech (even though he'·
despises the broadcasting corporat10n and calls public television
"cultural dictatorship").6 Taylor's outspoken leftist views are
well known in England, owing to his notoriety as an uninhibited
columnist, a flare that cost him a full professorship at London
University when he refused to trade in his journalism for the
chair. 7 It would not have been the best trade possible, for by
his own admission he makes substantially more money from journalism than he does from teaching or writing history.8
And what of Taylor's writing of history? That it sells
is no secret, but why it sells is somewhat mystifying to many
of his critical colleagues.
It would do them well to take more
Mark Lega
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110tice 01 the Taylor-style (at least on this point).
One
reviewel' recently remarked that Taylor had never been known
to usc a superIluous word or "write an inelegant sentence.,,9
Others have noted his "vigorous prose"lO and " relent l ess staccato
01 short sentences ." ll Taylor celtainly owns and uses his
consummate writ1ng skills to their full advantages.
Numerous
re1 rences are available concerning his liveliness, wit, clarity
01 narrative, and idiosyncratic charm.
In 1955, in an anonymous
New Yorker review of Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918,
it was written that, "Perhaps not S1nce G1bbon ha s a descent into
the maelstrom been chronicled with so much style and wit."12 It
is a distinctive style, and one that has so far endured numerous
hostile reactions from some quarters.
It is what makes A . J. P.
Taylor more readable than ninety-nine percent of his contemporaries;
it is as Hugh Brogan calls it, "the Taylor sparkle. ,,13
If Taylor's professional colleagues all agree o n the
readability of his history, there is a divergence 01 opinion
concerning the advisability of reading it seriously.
It has
been noted that Taylor is a meticulous researcher, especia lly
concerning his works Struggle For Mastery in Europe and more
recently Beaverbrook . 14 He is never faulted for taking simplistic views and i s much praised [or his f r esh ness of approach.
It is this freshness that has at times led to co nflicts with
his co n temporar i es .
Tile reviews of his work Politics in Wartime and Other Essays
are illustrative of this point.
George Li chthe im in New Statesman
wrote about the contents being Silly and (when in regard to
Hitler) perverse. 15 F. H. Hinsl ey on the New York Review of
Books regards Taylor as "deficient in the historical imagination."16
Yet at this same time P. W. Filby in Library Journal d e lights in
Taylor's "history with a smile."17 Newsweek described Taylor's
work as "vigorous.
. with color, cogency and a kind of acid and
grumbling c harm."18
It seems, as Edward Segal has written, that Taylor has won
respect lor his brilliance and originality while provoking
indignation at those alleged vices of too much wit and too great
a penchant for s tartling statements . 19 Perhaps Taylor extrac ts
too great a proportion of irony and humor where the more
professional historian sees conspiracy and drama? What is it
that so irritates his crit ics? How is he seen by them? What
are his answers?
A. J. P. Taylor offers no formulas, but he does assert
that there are permanent regulations in history. Throughout
his works one reads phrases lik e "the logic of events" and "by
an in evitab l e 10g ic.,,20 He has written that:
.history has its own logi cal laws.
But
Certainly.
these laws resemble rather those by which llood-water
flows into hitherto unseen channels and forces its elf
linally to an unpredictable sea. 21
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Notice that Taylor lays no claim to realizing historical
logic, but only that it exists. Eigbt years after having
written the above passage Taylor remained of the same mind; in
a letter to Ved Mehta he wrote, "I have no theories 01 history
and I know nothing of them."22
If. R. Trevor-Roper has claimed that Taylor is "not noted
for consistency. "23 It is a charge that could be hurled at
Taylor's critics, Trevor-Roper not excluded.
In English History
1914-1945 Taylor made it clear that he believed that the people
are better than the governors and that the besL politicians are
those that identify with the people, that the people's enemies
are civil servants, intellectuals, and capitalists. 24 Yet
Trevor-Roper can write that Taylor "does not believe that human
agents matter much in history.,,25 Indeed? Taylor is no doubt
a democrat with a deep faith in the ultimate good sense of the
people. 26

This faith has led to the labeling of Taylor as the English
populist historian, and led him to be criticized for making
Chaplin more relevant in the inter-war years than Virginia
Woolf. 27 Taylor does not deny the indictment.
He is first a
concerned citizen and secondly a historian. On this he has said
that however professionally dedicated, the historian "remains
primarily a citizen . To turn from political responsibility to
dedica tion is to open the door to tyranny and measurable barbarism. ,,28
The acceptance of responsibility would seem to be laudable,
even to academics that perform their tasks in hollow libraries
behind dirty manuscripts. The problem for Taylor and his critics
is that he assumes responsibility for the present and refuses
the professional responsibility of confirming consensus evaluation.
In reply Taylor says:
tHistoriansJ have to state the truth as they see it
without worrying whether it shocks or confirms
existing prejudices.
Maybe 1 assumed this too
innocently.
. I do not come to history as a judge. 29
In addition to his refusal to bow before the consensus
opinion of his counterparts, Taylor goes one step farther . He
refuses to even start from the pOSition that the consensus is
correct.
What has been called intellectual frivolity smacks
of determination to defy the would-be historian's hierarchy
until proven wrong. Taylor refuses to become sterile in his
studies.
"There is," writes Taylor, "nothing more agreeable
than to make peace with the Establishment, and nothing more
corrupting. "30
Taylor's rebelliousness places his view of history at odds
with Western (and especially British) culture. For men of the
West are confident that constitutional order, pragmatic convention,
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and the rule of law are all important. Th e brash and the deviant,
s u ch as Taylor and his views, are held at arm's l e ngth and ignor ed
lest they upset the balance--all the more reason f or effic i ent
his torians to read him.
II.

CRITICISM OF THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
AND TAYLOR'S DEFENSE

In 1961 the most cont rovers ial of A. J. P. Ta y lor's books
appeared.
I t was attacked mightily by prominent me n who saw, or
thought they saw, an absolution of Hi t l er within its pages.
First some of the critics and then Mr. Taylor's d efe ns e of h i s
work.
F. H. Soward in Canadian Forum:
"The author goes to the.
extreme to g iv e Hitler the benef 1t of the doubt and to flay his
opponents. "31 And Rob er t Spencer in Canadi an Historical Review
d etects "factual err ors , mis-statements c on cern1 ng H1tl e r's
policy, apparent co ntradiction , misu se of ev id e nce, and es pecially
a complete distortion of the personality of Hitler."32
Many America n rev i ewers were l ess kind.
S. W. Halp er in
in the Chicago Sunday Tribune a cc us e d Taylor of giving comfort
to the n eo- Na z is and "the forc es of evil everywh e r e. " This in
addition to questioning the int egr ity of th e author's r e search. 33
E. S. Pisko writing for the Christian Science Monitor noted what
he thought to be a ju ggli ng of facts in a " g rot es que attempt to
stand history on it s head.
.he has been writing about a Hitler
who n ever existed. ,,34 G. A. Craig also saw value in the book
for those who would "r eha bilitat e the Fu e h rer 's reputation,"
and sighs that "one almost regrets having to note that its
brillianc e is exceeded by its perverseness."35
Jam es Joll , writing for Spectator admonishes the reader to
be leary ; tha t whatever he reads, H1 tIer was too "more wicked. . .
in principle and doctrine than any other contemporary statesman. ,,36
A. L. Rouse is es pecially damning . Rowse condemns Taylor as
being irr esponsible in scholarship and judgment, and warns th e
reader that the book is "flawed from top to bottom and offers an
exemplary instance Lof.} how history should not b e written.,,37
On a mor e specific level, Raymond Sontag in the American
Histori ca l Re vi e w takes pains to show how Taylor has manipulated
evidence in r ega rds to the fall of Prague in Spring , 1939. 38
Edward S egel in 1964 in Rev i e w of Politics charges Taylor on
two counts, firs~ that h e lacks respect for sources other than
diplomatic; and second, that within the documents he goes to,
he is highly selective. Segel mak es a stroog argument against
Taylor for dismissing Hitler's antics as play-acting. 39
Time magazin e, not missing a beat in its rol e as the
establishment newsweekly, draws the weak conclusion that even
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"Taylor states the case for appeasing Hitler and for resisting
him.
. his sympathies obviously lie with the appeasers. ,,40 Less
scathingly, and more diplomatically, Harry Pitt of the University
of South Carolina has said, "It's completely wrong, but you can ' t
prove it.. "41
The most interesting attacks came from fellow Oxford don,
H. R. Trevor-Roper. On the heals of the book's publication ,
Trevor-Roper wrote a biting eight-page review in the July, 1961
issue of Encounter.
Within that review Trevor-Roper attacked
Taylor for everything from arrogance to sloppy research to
Khrushchev's belligerence towards the West. 42
This attack was too much for Taylor and in September's
Encounter he replied, ending his remarks by noting that "the
Regins Professor's methods of quotation might . . . do harm to his
reputation as a serious historian, if he had one."43 To which
Trevor-Roper took the next two pages in order to answer, "I am
unmoved."44 The contest spread to other journals and included a
standoff television debate. 45
Lest a false impression be given, note that A. J. P. Taylor
was not without some defenders.
H. E. Barnes wrote in May,
1962 that Origins was "notable and salutary" for provoking
thought concerning the circumstances leading to the Second World
War. Barnes noted also something that the book's critics seem
to forget; Taylor's reputation (well known until 1961) as a most
consistent and unabashed Germanophobe.
It was this, said Barnes,
tha t lends the work's revisionism strengths.
"This fact. . .
would seem to reflect integrity and courage rather than past
phobias and partisanship.,,<i6
Herbert Butterfield, author of The Whig Interpretation of
History told Ved Mehta that:
LOrigin~ represents a later stage in the development of historiography--namely the very difficult
point where one begins to go over the story without always having in mind the way that the story
ended. 47

And though it cannot be certain, Mehta believes that Lewis Namier,
the most reputable of historians, would have sided with Taylor.
(Mehta bases this on the long conversation he had with Namier
shortly before the historian's death.)48
Taylor defended himself most fully in Origins second
edition by adding a chapter entitled "Second Thoughts." This
chapter plus the "Preface to the American Reader" constitutes
the bulk of Taylor's defense.
On the question of appeasement, Taylor has replied:
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Some English critics of this book complained that
I had "apologized" for Hitler or for the appeaser.
Nothing could be further from my thoughts.
I have
a clear record here.
I was addressing public meetings against appeasement--and a very uphill work
it was--when my critics were confining their
activities to the seclusions of Oxford common
rooms. 49
On the subject of Hitler's vindication, Taylor blasted
those who complained that his work did such a thing . For Taylor
this was no argument. History was not for use against the
enemies of mankind.
If the record disproves a legend, it would
be bett er to blame those who perpetrated the legend as ignorant,
rather than ignore the latest evidence. Taylor goes on to
argue tha t destroying Hi tIer ian legends is a service to truth
and not a vindication of whatever evil the Fuehrer caused to
occur.
Taylor debunks the idea of Hitler as a second Attila with
a long-term coherent plan for enslaving Europe, or at least the
entire eastern half of the continent . Noting that Hitler
speculated about what he was dOing, Taylor claims that the
record offers no proof of a plan beyond opportunism. As an
example, Taylor points out that few believe Hitler worked out
some elaborate plan to come to power . Does this revision vindicate Hitler? No, says Taylor, it only discredits Papen and his
associa tes.
"It is. . . revisions. . . for the sake of historica 1
truth."
Taylor points out also that Burton Klein, an economist for
RAND corporation backs up the "no-plan" thesis in a 1959 study.
If Hitler had a time-table for aggression, his failure to place
the nation on a war-footing is a puzzle. Taylor notes Klein
has concluded that "Until the spring of 1936, rearmament was
largely a myth."50
Taylor goes further to draw a parallel between Hitler's
waiting for the opportunity to seize iron-control of Germany
and waiting for opportunities later on in international affairs.
Taylor cites Fritz Tobias' Reichstagbrand (1962) as shooting to
pieces the legend that has grown around the Reichstag fire.
Hitler, says Tobias (and Taylor), was taken by surprise--and
retreated.
Hitler is seen as only a moderate compared to his predecessors in regards to lebensraum by Taylor . This is a hard
place to attack Taylor, because as he points out, Mein Kampf
only devotes seven of seven hundred pages to the discuss10n .
It should also be noted that available published writings of
Hitler, excluding Mein Kampf, place no undue stress on this
traditional German goal. 51
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The Taylor argument rests not on th e belief that Hitler
was not evil, but on the absense in the diplomatic docum e nts
that he plotted his dOings on a chart or graph of some type.
Taylor admits to Hitler's wickedness, he rejects as myth that
Hitler controlled his own (and Europe's) destiny . 52 In anoth e r
place Ta'ylor has noted that:
If you regard a plan as a
course, Hitler did have a
But if you define plan as
moves , then Hitler didn't

great v1s10n , then , of
plan--a lunatic vision.
I do , a plan of day-to-day
have one. 53

In a mood of reflection, after the storm o ve r Origins,
Taylor related what he felt the problem was that l e d to such
strong dauncia tion.
The trouble with my book may be that in a number
of places I left my own side very weak .
I tend
to think that if I have written one or two sentences . . . that's enough . . . 1 know I know . . .
and I know other people know ; after all , I didn't
write my book to be read as the only book on
the origins of the Se cond World War . 54
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THE HARTFORD CONVENTION:

THOSE "WISE MEN OF THE EAST"

The Hartford Convention aroused great emotion for many
years after the War of 1812.
Its supporte rs considered it to be
a convention of statesmen, attempting to save the Union from
democratic excesses, while its critics felt it was a gathering
of traitors, bent on destroying that same Union.
In actuality ,
the Hartford Convention was th e last effort of th e Federalist
Party to remain an important fac tor in national politi cs .
When the War of 1812 began , New England F e deralists refused
to support the Madison administration's war efforts with eit her
money or vocal support. As the war continued with no e nd in
sight , the New Englanders became restless.
When Congress e nacted
an embargo in 1813 to halt the flourishing New England trade
with th e e nemy , Federalist patienc e ceased; and murmurings of
rebellion b egan to run throughout th e commercial and shipping
towns of Massachusetts. l
The movement for a New England convention began in Massachusetts, but not in Boston, as would seem like ly. According
to Noah Webster, "The first proposals for a convention proceeded
from the people in their primary assemblies. Not one person in
Boston had any concern in those proposals."
Instead , the
Hampshire County town of Northampton originated the idea. Several
of the town's leading men, unhappy with the war's progress and
the embargo , invited a number of leading citizens from surrounding
towns to discuss the prevailing conditions and to make their
sentiments known to th e Massachusetts General Court. The invitation ,
dated January 5, 1814, requested a meeting on January 19 at
Northampton "for the purpose of a free and dispassionate discussion touching our public concerns. " 2
At this meeting, a circular letter was authori zed to be
sent to all towns in Hampdon, Franklin, and Hampshire counties.
The letter listed several complaints against Madison's government; they included the embargo's unconstitutionality and the
hardships created by it, and the lack of proper r e presentation
in Congress for the commercial states.
It also suggested that
town meetings
"address memorials to the General Court . . . petitioning
that honorable body to propose a convention of all the
Northern and Commercial States, . . . for procurring
such alterations in the federal constitution as will
give the Northern States a due proportion of representation , and secure them from the future exercise of
powers injurious to their commercial interests . . . . ,,3
Raymond T. Tatum
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This l e tter was soon spread throughout most of Massachusetts.
Over forty towns sent memorials to the Ge neral Court requesting
action for th e ir grievances.
Northampton and Hatfield asked
that constitutional amendments favoring New England be proposed ,
either by a convention or by any suitable me ans. Amherst urged
the legislatur e "to take the most vigorous and decisive measures"
to restor e p eace . Ne wbury refused to rule out violence; "We
calIon our Stat e legislatur e to protect us in the enjoyment
of those privil eges to assert which our fathers died, and to
defend which we prof e ss ourselves ready to resist unto blood."
Every memorial liste d th e hated embargo as a major grievance. 4
Popular exc iteme nt had reached a level that Federalist
lead e rs f ound difficult to control.
In the General Court , order
was hard to maintain when extremist F e deralists praising Great
Britain , vili fy ing th e administration, and proposing radical
me asur es, such as sec e ssion, were loudly applauded by the public
galleries. Harrison Gray Otis, a Boston legislator and a Central
Committeeman in the Federalist Party, was given the task of
smother ing the agitation, although he was, as one observer said,
"without th e slight e st taste for political martyrdom." He
supported th e doctrine of secession in the Court chamber, but
added that th e time was not right for such an extreme action.
With the help of other moderates~ plans for a convention were
postponed , at least temporarily.~
In ea rly F e bruary, a special committee issued a report on
the town memorials.
It r ejec ted a p e tition to Congress on the
grounds that such an action was utterly futile, and stated that
the embargo was unconstitutional and therefor e void. A New
England Convention to propose constitutional amendments was
approved, but it recommended that public approval be obtained
f irst in th e spring state elections. 6
Th e Republican candidate for governor, Samuel Dexter, was a
moderate Fe deralist who disapproved of the proposed convention.
The election became a referendum on the convention. With 55
percent of the vote going to th e Federalist, Caleb Strong , the
convention r ece ived a vote of confidence.
In the legislative
e lection held soon afterwards, Federalists gained a majority of
204 in the lower house . 7
The convention had been approved by the voters. But , in
the mea ntime, President Madison had allowed Congress to repeal
the embargo, dampening the popular clamor for the convention.
With public agitation reduced, and with Otis arguing that a
convention might harm the peace negotiations at Ghent, the party
leadership ignored demands for an early meeting. The Genera
Court met that summer, and took no action. All seemed calm .

g

That calm was broken by th e expansion of the war during the
summer of 1814. British military engagements along the New
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England coastline began in July; in August, Washington was burned,
and Maine invaded, with the British occupying United States
territory from Canada south to the Penobscot River.
It was
rumored that a British force, led by General Rowland Hill, was
preparing to leave Britain to invade New England. Fueled by
the deteriorating situation, demands for a separate peace and
secession joined existing complaints over the Massachusetts
government's inaction. Thus pressured by external invasion and
internal rebellion, the Federalist state leaders went ahead with
convention plans.
In early September, Governor Strong ordered
the General Court back into special session to adopt such
measures as "the present dangerous state of public affairs may
render expedient."g
Before the special session began, Federalist leaders devised
a plan of action. They had to satisfy the public, whose language
was "high toned and menacing," according to Otis. But few wanted
outright secession; most party leaders were moderates who still
had hopes of regaining power in Washington. Of all the demands
listed by the public, the convention scheme alone seemed "constitutional and peaceable." To save the special session from
indecision or from producing violent measures, leading members
of the Federalist caucus and the Central Committee decided to
support "the sentiments of our country friends" in fa vor of a
convention in order to keep it from becoming too radical. lO
A cautious, low-keyed speech by Governor Strong at the
opening session of the General Court on October 17 was referred
to a joint committee chaired by Otis. By careful prearrangement,
moderates dominated this committee. The legislature received its
report the next day. This paper, known as "Otis's Report" after
its author, urged the state to withhold its taxes from the
federal treasury in order to support its own defense against
the British. It also stated that the Constitution had failed
to provide New England with the rights and benefits expected
from it, and therefore required immediate change. To bring about
this change, the report proposed a convention "between those
states the affinity of whose interests is closest" which would
meet in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 15, 1814. This
convention would devise a system of common defense for New
England and would "enable delegates from those sta tes.
to
lay the foundation for a radical reform in the national compact.
The report ended with several resolutions, one of which called
for the appointment of delegates to the convention. ll
Radicals tried to add several more extreme measures, but
failed.
John Lowell believed that the convention would be too
moderate, but his was the minority view. House members did
commit the delegation to support constitutional amendments
rectifying abuses in slave representation and the congressional
power to lay embargoes. 12

"
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On October 18 , "Otis's Report" was approved by wide margins
in both houses--22 to 12 in the Senate and 260 to 90 in the
House--with a number of Republican l egislators refusing to vote.
Approval was then given to send th e report and letters of
invitation to the other New England states. 13
The vocal minorities in both houses submitted protests
against th e convention. The Se nate protest stated "No state
should e nt e r into any compact or agreeme nt with another without
the consent of Congress." The House protest , signed by 75
legislators, felt that "However disguised or designed," this
convention would "prepare the way for a separation and division
of the Union." The Federalist majority refused to record
e ith er prot est, deeming them "disrespectful.,,14
Wh e n the Connecticut legislatur e received its invitation,
it was r efer r e d, as usual, to a committee . The committee report
d en ounced the Madison administration's attachment to Napolean
and its abandonment of New England defense.
It compared the
peac e, when "our cities and villages exhibited indications of
incr eas ing wealth," to existence during the war, when "the fleets
o f a powerful e n emy hover on our coasts; blockade our harbours;
and threaten our towns and citizens with fire and desolation."
The committee approved of th e convention, and asked that delegates
from Connecticut be appointed to confer on those subjects proposed by Massachusetts , plus "any other subj ec ts which may come
before them."
The Connecticut legislature approved this report
by a vote of 153 to 36. 15
The Rhode Island legislative committee that handled the
Massachusetts invitation confined itself to a discussion of the
military situation and the federal government's failure to
protect the state.
It asked that delegates b e sent to confer on
"the best means of co-operating for our mutual defense" and on
the best way of restoring the people's "rights and privileges"
under the Constitution. The vote in the assembly was 39 to 28 in
favor; as in Massachusetts, a Republican protest was not entered
into the records. 16
New Hampshire and Vermont did not approve of the convention
as expected.
In New Hampshire, a combination of the legislature's
adjournment, Republican control of the governor's council, and
indifference on the part of most Federalist leaders made formal
participation impossible. However, party organizations in two
counties along the Connecticut River went ahead and appointed a
couple of delegates to the convention. The British invasion of
Lake Champlain during the summer had put an end to partisan
bickering in Vermont. The Federalist governor there believed
that the war was a defensive one now, and should be supported by
everyone. The Federalist-controlled legislature rejected the
invitation unanimously. But, as in New Hampshire, one county
sent its own delegate. 17 The abstention of Vermont and New
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Hampshire, plus the presence of vocal minorities in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, weakened the c onvention, because it showed that
not even New England was united behind it .
Advice, much of it conflicting, soon descended on the convention delegates. Gouverneur Morris urged them to support an
autonomous New England confederacy , while Thomas Pickering, a
prominent Federalist extremist, wanted the West forced out of
the Union, restoring the eastern commercial states to the preeminence that they had once enjoyed. Lowell wanted the
Constitution suspended and New England declared neutral for the
remainder of the war. At the same time, moderation was urged
by others, Robert Goodloe Harper of Baltimore warned that southern
Federalists would not tolerate New England obstructionism. A
couple of middle-state Federalists argued against the convention;
Oliver Wolcott believed it to be unconstitutional, while Rufus
King feared that it might, horror of horrors, satisfy public
opinion. 18
The delegates to the Hartford Convention had a good deal of
pressure placed on their shoulders. They numbered 26 and
represented the political and legal expertise of New England
Federalism. All were political activists and leaders of their
communities. Twenty-one were lawyers, with the remainder
merchants; twenty-two were college graduates, and nine had served
as judges. The average age was 52. They were mature and
responsible men, not the sort to risk both neck and property in
an abortive rebellion. 19
Massachusetts sent the largest delegation:
twelve. George
Cabot, a founder of the Federalist Party and a former United
States Senator from Massachusetts, had stepped out of retirement
to head the delegation. He distrusted democracy, but had
mellowed with years and served as a restraining influence at the
convention . His presence in the delegation did not please
extremist Federalists at all; both Pickering and Lowell saw Cabot
as a man "most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the
duty of a delegate."
He was skeptical of human nature, asking a
friend once, "Why can't you and I let the world ruin itself its
own way?" He became a delegate, he said, "to keep you young
hotheads from getting into mischief." Cabot was clearly not a
maker of revolutions. 20
Most other Massachusetts delegates were also moderates.
Harrison Gray Otis had led the moderates in the General Court,
and proved to be a moderate influence at Hartford. A successful
lawyer and the bearer of a distinguished Massachusetts name, Otis
was an eloquent speaker and possessed great charm.
Joseph Lyman,
a leading figure at the Northampton meetings in January, 1814,
was a delegate, as was Timothy Bigelow, the speaker of the
Massachusetts House. Nathan Dane, the author of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, Stephen Longfellow, father of the poet, and
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William Prescott, father of the historian, also attended.
Joshua
Thomas, Samuel Sumner Wilde, George Bliss, Daniel Waldo , and
Hodijah Baylies rounded out the list . All but Bigelow and Bliss
were considered moderates. 21
The Connecticut delegation was l e d by Lieutenant-Governor
Chauncey Goodrich, a veteran congressman and one-time major of
Hartford.
James Hillhouse was treasur e r of Yale; he had fought
in the Revo lution, and had served in Congress for 20 years. The
oldest delegate at Hartford was John Treadwell, who had served
in the Continental Congress and both houses of the Connecticut
legislature, and had been both governor and lieutenant-governor
of Connecticut. Zephaniah Swift and Nathaniel Smith had served
in Congr ess, and were now the chief justice and an associate
justice, respectively, of the state Supreme Court . Calvin
Goddard had spent four years in Congr e ss and 17 years as major of
Norwich, and was appointed to the state Supr e me Court shortly
after the convention. Roger Minot Sherman was a reputable lawyer
and l eg islator. The Connecticut d elegation was seen as "a
collection of sedate, temperate, serious, and . . . generally
wise men.,,22
The Rhode Island delegation did not have as much experience
in national politics as the other two delegations had. This can
perhaps be explained by Rhode Island's previous disdain for
unified state action. Daniel Lyman, Rhode Island's chief
j ustice , had been a major during the Revolution, and was now the
presiden t of the Society of the Cincinnati. Samuel Ward was the
son of the founder of Brown University, and had fought with
Benedict Arnold in the unsuccessful 1775 expedition against
Quebec. Benjamin Hazard and Edward Manton were state legislators. 23
The representative from Cheshire County, New Hampshire,
Benjamin West, was known as a "refuser of offices." He had been
elected to the Articles of Confederation Congress, the state
constitutional convention, and the United States House o f Representatives, and had refused all three. The other New Hampshire
delegate, Miles Olcott of Grafton County, was a lawyer.
William
Hall, a merchant from Bellow Falls, Vermont, completed the list
of convention delegates. 24
On the morning of December 15, all but two of the delegates
had assembled in Hartford for the opening session of the convention.
The Connecticut State House Council Chamber had been placed at
their disposal by the legislature.
Cabot was unanimously elected
president of the body, and Theodore Dwight, the editor of the
Connecticut Mirror, was the unanimous choice as secretary.25
Otis, Hillhouse, and Lyman were appointed to the credentials
committee, which verified everyone's credentials . A rules committee,
composed of Goddard, Bigelow, and Lyman, was then nam ed, and the
assembly was adjourned until that afternoon.
When they reconvened,
the rules drawn up by the committee were approved. Most were
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either trivial or inoffensive; however, the second rule gave the
delegates a great deal of grief later on.
It read, "The most
inviolable secrecy shall be observed by each member of this
Convention, including the Secretary, as to all propositions,
debates, . and proceedings thereof, until this injunction shall be
suspended or altered." The arguments for secrecy later given by
the delegates were custom--the Constitutional Convention had met
in private--and speed--business could be handled much faster
without outside pressure. But with the country at war and with
Republican distrust of the convention prevalent, secrecy was
unwise. The public immediately assumed that the delegates were
hiding treasonable debate. This accusation haunted the delegates
and their work for many years. 26
After the approval of rules, a committee of five was appointed
to prepare a list of "proper" subjects for discussion. Goodrich,
Otis, Daniel Lyman, Swift, and Dane were appointed. 27
The next day, Ward arrived from Rhode Island, and was seated.
The committee of five then submitted its report of discussion
topics.
It listed the constitutional question of militia command,
the issue of federal reimbursement for the expenses of mobilized
militia not under federal command, the constitutionality of
military conscription, the general expenses of the war, and the
matter of state defense. 28
Two days of discussion followed. A number of delegates wanted
to include a set of constitutional amendments, which the report
had not mentioned.
Several, such as Hillhouse and Bigelow wanted
extremer action taken than desired by the moderates. On the 19th,
Cabot appointed a committee to draft a set of proposals for
adoption. The committee members were Smith, Otis, Goddard, West,
and Hazard, with the more outspoken members pOintedly excluded.
The next day, this committee submitted its report, which was
similar to the December 16 report and did not include any amendments. Debate went on until December 24, when the report was
approved, but with six amendments added to the original. This
report, with the addition of another amendment on December 29,
was the basis for the final convention report. 29
On December 21, a committee of seven had been appointed to
prepare a final convention report. Otis was the chairman, and
was joined by Smith, Sberman, Dane, Prescott, West, and Hazard.
This committee received the adopted proposals on the 24th and went
to work. The convention, waiting for the final draft, had little
to do between December 26 and 30, except admit Hall of Vermont on
the 28th. On Friday, December 30, the final report was ready for
discussion.
Examined paragraph by paragraph, the first eight
pages were returned to the committee for revision on the 31st.
Finally, on the afternoon of January 3, 1815, the report was
approved by the entire convention.
Wrapping up unfinished
business, the Hartford Convention adjourned on January 5. 30
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During the convention's meetings, public opinion had been
greatly aroused by its secrecy. This secrecy seems to have been
kept very strictly; other Federalists knew as little about the
convention proceedings as the Republicans. Their hopes were high,
though.
In a letter to Pickering, Gouverneur Morris wrote that
his "eyes are fixed on a star in the East, which . . . !he believec!7
to be the dayspring of freedom and glory." The Boston Columbian
Centinel, on December 28, asked the convention to free New
England from "the tyrannical oppression" of the Republicans. 3l
The Republican newspapers also had comments to make about
the convention. According to the Hartford American Mercury,
Hartford bystanders had expressions of loath1ng and d1sgust as
the delegates assembled December 15. The American flag was displayed at half-mast, three meetinghouses tolled their bells
solemnly, and "appropriate (funeral) marches" were played in the
streets. According to the Mercury, the delegates appeared
melancholy and fearful while walking the streets, rarely looking
up except when passing a tree or some object from which a person
could be hanged. 32 The Boston Patriot recommended arresting the
delegates as traitors at the first overt act of treason, but the
Kentucky Gazette believed that the Federalists would not put the
government to that much trouble, calling them "fools and cowards-and as such will never risk any other punishment than that of
being heartily laughed at."33
Despite the sneers, the administration worried about the
convention and the possibility of revolt. A young Kentuckian,
Major Thomas T. Jessup, was stationed with his regiment at
Hartford during the convention. Officially there to recruit, he
also had orders to watch the convention for any overt signs of
rebellion.
With his troops and New York troops under Governor
Daniel Tompkins A the administration was prepared to crush any
sign of revolt.~4
The final report of the Hartford Convention was published in
an extra of the Hartford Courant on January 6.
It was soon
reprinted by a number of newspapers including the Lexington
Western Monitor, and as a pamphlet. 35 In its opening paragraphs,
the report acknowledged the difficulties faced by the delegates
in finding constitutional means of ending federal oppression and
enacting reforms without "disappointing the hopes of a suffering
and injured people." Reform through legitimate channels might
seem irksome, "but when corruption existed throughout the government, no quick means of relief existed" without recourse to
direct and open resistance.
"which should be avoided.
Some might regard the evils surrounding them as "intrinsic and
incurrable defects in the constitution." But the convention did
not agree, and urged moderation for several reasons. After all,
the Constitution had worked nicely under "a wise and virtuous"
government--in other words, under Federalists. The existing
troubles had been caused by the incompetence, corruption, and
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oppression of the Republicans. Therefore, these officials should
be replaced.
"But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change
the Constitution would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution."
Also , tbe Napoleonic wars had misled many people into supporting
France . . With Napoleon now conquer e d, these citize ns would real ize
that America's true interests rested with Gr e at Britain. A
third reason for moderation was th e war itself . The convention
felt if the Union had to separate, it should be by common consent
during peacetime, instead of violently while at war.36
The report was phrased in su c h a way as to placate both sides.
The extremists were encouraged to think that the Convention
supported their views, but not their timing.
Mod e rates, on the
other hand, were given th e impr e ssion that the extr e mist viewpoint
had been rejected. The desire to conciliate both sides and hold
the party together was strong. 37
The Madison administration's military policy was discussed
next. The division of the country into military districts and
the use of army conscription were denounced as unconstitutional.
The delegates admitted that the president had the power to take
command of the state militias under certain circumstances, but
argued that the states could ignor e a presidential summons if
they wished. The states were encouraged to uphold th e ir authority
against encroachment by the national government. 38
The report now turns to New England defense. By diverting
manpower and supplies in a futile attempt to conquer Canada, the
administration had "left the exposed and vulnerable parts of the
country destitute of all the efficient means of defense." The
lack of federal troops had forced the states to depend on their
militias. The administration had refused to pay the expenses of
militias not under federal control. This expense placed a
strain on state finances, because they were paying to the federal
treasury at the same time. Because the national government was
on the verge of bankruptcy, New England expected little improvement
in federal defense. Therefore, they suggested that "these states.
be allowed to assume their own defense, by the militia or other
tropps." To pay for this defense, "a reasonable portion" of the
federal taxes raised in the states should be retained by them. 39
The next two pages were basically a Federalist party manifesto.
It is a list of Republican practices that they believe have led
the country to ruin . The most important objection was the
Republicans' use of "local jealousies and ambition, so as to
secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union, the
controul [siC<.! of public affairs in perpetual succession."
Another objection was the exclusion of Federalists from the
national government by the Republicans . The convention also
disapproved of the Republicans' "unconstitutional" interference
with the courts, their mishandling of the economy, and the use of
patronage as a political tool. An important New England objection
included was the destruction of "the balance of power which
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existed among the original states" by the admission of new states.
The convention also disliked the appointment of naturalized
citizens to high office, the Republicans' tilt toward France at
Great Britain's expense, and the attempt to use commerce as "an
instrument of coercion and war. "40
In order to correct these constitutional errors, the convention proposed seven constitutional amendments, limited to
"essential" matters. The stated object of the amendments was "to
strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the union of the
s ta tes.
"The first amendment would ha ve abolished the threefifths compromise, and would have based direct taxes and representation in th e House of Representatives--and therefore the Electoral
College --on the number of free inhabitants in each state . The
second "indispensable" amendment would have required a two-thirds
vote of both houses of Congress to admit new states to the Union,
giving the commercial, Federalist states a veto over the creation
of new state s. The third and fourth amendments would have limited
an embargo to 60 days, and would have required a two-thirds vote
of Congr e ss to ban commercial relations between the United States
and another country.41
Th e fifth amendment would have required a two-thirds vote
of both houses of Congress for a declaration of war . The
Federalists argued that the war had been started by the western
states, which were not in danger of invasion or blockade, unlike
the coastal states . A sixth amendment would have barred naturalized
citizens from sitting in Congress or from holding any civil office
in the government. The last amendment would have restricted a
president to a single term of office, and would have forbidden
the election of presidents from the same state for successive
terms.
"A president whose political career is limited to a
single election, may find no other interest .
. Lthan that ot?
making it glorious to himself, and beneficial to his country . ,,42
The report concluded with a number of resolutions. The
first one recommended that the New England states adopt all
measures needed to protect their people from unconstitutional
acts passed by Congress. A second resolution urged these states
to petition Congress for approval of the defense recommendations
made by the convention, while the third recommended the creation
of state armies. The next resolution asked that New England
approve th e amendments listed and submit them to other states
for adoption.
If Congress failed to act on the Federalist
grievances, there should be a second New England convention, to
b e held at Boston on the third Thursday of June, 1815 . If a
crisis should arise before then, Cabot, Goodrich, and Lyman
were authorized to call another meeting of the delegates at
Boston. Last of all are the delegates' signatures, with
Massachusetts heading the list. 43
Fe deralist reaction to the convention report was mixed.
Pickering and Lowell considered it to be too moderate, while
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others felt that a constitutional convention should have been
called. Arthur Bryant of Northampton wrote his son, William
Cullen, '~ur Federalists were much disappointed, saying that
they dared not adopt any energetic measures, but would go on in
the wa y of supplica tion.
"But the maj ori ty of the Federa lists
applauded the "moderate but firm" report.
Governor Strong and
Senator Gore of Massachusetts, John Jay, and Daniel Webster were
just a few of the report's admirers. 44 In Philadelphia, the
following toast was made at a Washington's Birthday dinner:
"The Hartford Convention, the dignified apostles of the true
poli tica 1 fa i th ! "45
Republicans generally were relieved by the convention's
moderation. The organ of the administration, the National
Intelligencer, felt that "the proceedings are tempered with more
moderation than was to have been expected." Several newspapers
needled the convention delegates; the Montreal Courant and Herald
called them "the Hucksters in Chief of the United States." The
Kentucky Gazette seems to have summed up Republican sentiment
nicely; "The mountain has neither bro't forth a mouse, nor
termina ted in a volcano. "46
By January 18, when the Massachusetts General Court met for
its winter session, Federalist spirits had been raised considerably.
In his opening speech, Governor Strong praised the
convention for preventing a "fatal excess" of extremism. The
legislature quickly approved a resolution stating that it did
"highly approve" the delegates' work. The Connecticut legislature
also approved the report.
But Rhode Island and New Hampshire
took no action on it, and ten other states rejected it.47
When the General Court approved the convention report, it
also authorized a commission of three to go to Washington to
arrange for the transfer of defense responsibilities from the
federal government to Massachusetts. Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas
H. Perkins, and William Sullivan were chosen. They left Boston
on February 3, two days after learning of Jackson's victory at
New Orleans, and arrived in Washington on the 13th. The very
next day, the capital learned that the Treaty of Ghent had been
signed on December 24, 1814. The war was over, making the
commissioners' trip irrelevant. Ridiculed by the opposition
press, they remained long enough to argue their claims before a
skeptical administration, and then returned home. 48
Connecticut had also sent a couple of commissioners, Calvin
Goddard and Nathaniel Terry, to Washington. But they arrived
there after news of the peace treaty had arrived, and managed
to avoid the ridicule heaped on the Massachusetts delegates. 49
With the war over, Republican newspapers and wits lampooned
and satirized the Hartford Convention unmercifully.
One story
had a British officer taking a ride in the Connecticut countryside, where he met two British deserters. Asked where they were
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going, they replied , "the Hartford Convention." Hearing this
story, a Hartford citizen remarked, "then they lied, for the
Hartford Convention never deserted from his majesty's service . ,,50
The Hartford Convention was the dying gasp of the Federalist
Party. Outside of New England, only remnants of the party
remained. The War of 1812 had given the New England Federalists
a new vitality, but it was only temporary, America was changing;
Jacksonian democracy would appear in the not-so-distant future,
and ther e was no longer room for a party of the rich and wellborn .

60

Epitaph of the Hartford Convention
Missing.
Three well looking, responsible men, who appear to be
travelling towards Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's
Hotel, in Baltimore, on Monday evening last, and hav e not since
been heard of. They were observed to be very melancholy on
hearing the news of peace, and one of them was h ea rd to say,
with a great sigh, "Poor Caleb Strong." They took with them
their saddle-bags, so that no apprehension is e ntertained of
their having an intention to make away with themselves.
Whoever
will give any information to the Hartford Convention of the fate
of these unfortunate and tristful gentlemen by lett e r (post paid)
will confer a favor upon humanity.
The newspapers, particularly the Federal newspapers, are
requested to publish this advertisement in a conspicuous place,
and send their bills to the Hartford Convention.
P.S. One of the gentlemen was called Titus Oates, or some such
name. LSource:
the New York National AdvocateJ
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